An untapped resource

The wind energy dream seems to be fading, mainly because of the government's flawed policies

Naveed Ahmad

http://jang.com.pk/thenews/nov2008-weekly/nos-09-11-2008/pol1.htm#5

Pakistan's current energy crisis, coupled with a drastic reduction in the Chenab river's water after the commissioning of Baglihar Dam, has become the nation's worst nightmare. The country's dependence on oil and gas to meet its primary energy needs amounts to an astounding 83.8 percent, while the share of hydro, coal and nuclear energy is merely 11 percent, 4.6 percent and 0.2 percent, respectively. Pakistan's maximum capacity of power generation stands at 17,793 megawatts, but only on paper. This is due to a variety of operational reasons, ranging from technical faults in grids to the lack of water storage in reservoirs.

Karachi, the country's financial capital, witnessed the worst power outages this summer, bringing the commercial activity to a near standstill. Despite purchasing energy at a high cost, the existing gap between demand and supply in the city for any given day, especially in the summers, has proven impossible to bridge. The situation may easy a bit during winter, but there were no definitive answers with the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC) when The News on Sunday made inquires in this regard.

Karachi's population is projected to reach 20 million by 2015 from the existing 14 million, with power consumption expected to double. Exactly in the same year, the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP) will retire, according to the Planning Commission of Pakistan. Though the gradual switching over to the expensive nuclear power generation has met with some success on Chashma III and Chashma IV fronts with the Chinese technical support, the solution comes at a slow pace and high political costs.

For environmental and commercial reasons, the answer lies in the solar and wind energy, potential for both of which has exceeded Pakistan's expectations. The solar energy solution will become commercially viable the day it defeats the rich oil lobby. The state of California in the United States has been spearheading the drive to take the less-treaded paths of solar energy solutions, but the success faces bureaucratic hindrances rather than technical ones.

With Germany taking the lead, the entire Europe and many states in the United States and Canada have successfully harnessed clean and cheap wind energy. India has also been following suit with considerable success, knowing fully well the growing demand and increasing limitations of relying on power generation technologies dependent on water and petroleum. Malaysia and Indonesia have also realised this potential, given their vast coastal areas.

Scientifically speaking, global winds are caused by pressure differential across the earth's surface; the amount of solar radiation absorbed at the earth's surface is greater at the equator than at the poles, and the variation in the incoming heat sets up convective cells in the lowest layer of the atmosphere. On a smaller scale, wind is created because of temperature difference between land and seas and mountains and valleys. The local topographical features and roughness of the terrain also cause air movements.

Realising the tremendous potential of harnessing wind energy, especially in the wind corridor near Gharo along Sindh's coast belt, a detailed Wind Power Potential Survey of Coastal Areas of Pakistan was conducted by the Pakistan Meteorological Department in 2007. It estimates that the wind corridor in Sindh covers an area of about 9,700 square kilometres and the gross wind power potential of the region alone amounts to 43,000 megawatts. "Keeping in view the area utilisation constraints, the exploitable electric power generation potential of the area is estimated to be about 11,000 megawatts," the survey, however, adds.

During the three-year survey period, wind data was collected at 20 sites along Sindh's coastal belt. One minute speed and direction, five-minute average temperature, and 10-minute minimum and maximum wind speeds at 10-metre and 30-metre heights were recorded for this purpose. At 50-metre height, annual average wind speeds of 8.5, 7.0, 7.0, 6.7 and 6.6 metres per second were recorded at Jamshoro, Keti Bandar, Nooriabad, Thatta and Gharo, respectively. Annual wind power densities at Jamshoro, Nooriabad, Talhar, Keti Bandar, Thatta, Thana Bulakhan, Hyderabad and Gharo were recorded at 770, 454, 445, 374, 373, 371 and 350 watts per square metre, respectively.

According to international wind classification, this power density puts Jamshoro, Nooriabad, Talhar and Keti Bandar in the category of excellent sites and Thatta, Thana Bulakhan, Hyderabad and Gharo in the category of good sites for wind power generation. Monthly and annual values of wind-generated electric power have also been computed on a hypothetical 600 kilowatt wind turbine, the annual power production of which comes to 2.1 million kilowatt-hours (kWh) for Jamshoro, 1.5 million kWh for Keti Bandar, 1.5 million kWh for Nooriabad, 1.4 million kWh for Gharo and 1.3 million kWh for Thatta. Internationally, any site with a capacity of 25 percent is considered to be suitable for the installation of economically-viable commercial wind farms.

The government estimates that more than 5,000 villages can be electrified through wind energy in Sindh, Balochistan and the Northern Areas. Moreover, enormous wind energy potential exists in coastal areas of Balochistan, as well as desert areas of the Punjab and Sindh. Various international donors, such as USAID, GTZ and the UNDP, are eager to assist Pakistan in assessing and exploiting the same.

However, the meager efforts of the Alternate Energy Development Board (AEDB) aimed at harnessing wind energy are set to be reversed with the PPP-led coalition government mulling to cancel 93 letters of intent (LOIs) issued to national and multinational companies for setting up wind energy projects. Many investors had even got land allotted for installing wind energy farms, but delay on the part of the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) in deciding the tariff has been a major hurdle in the takeoff of these projects. With increasing tariffs and mounting installation costs, the interest of investors is waning, say senior officials in the Ministry of Water and Power.

It has been learned that the LOIs are set to be cancelled on the pretext of investors failing to meet the conditions and validity period in achieving the milestones associated with their LOI. The AEDB denies any likelihood of cancelling the LoIs and claims that the country's first-ever wind IPP will start power production before the end of the year. However, experts like Major (r) Asif Masood believe that the projects are less likely to materliase with an affordable tariff agreed with NEPRA. He explains that the private power producers as well as the government sector's power production cost varies between 3.5 cents per kWh and 6.2 cents per kWh.

The investors, on the other hand, complain of the lack of political will and red-tappism on the government's part. "The LoIs are being cancelled under political pressures in Sindh, so that the land spared for wind farms can be allotted the blued-eyed,î says one such licensee. The Ministry of Water and Power, as well as the AEDB, obviously refute these allegations.

Asif Masood says not only Pakistan is losing precious time with this delay, but also the cost of projects has mounted significantly. For example, he says, a 50-megawatt plan would have cost $110 million in 2004, but the same would now cost more than $160 million. "Also add to that the environmental and commercial price of expensive energy used till such clear initiatives materialise."

The AEDB, however, hopes that the first wind power project of Pakistan will be commissioned by the end of this year. Zorlu Enerji Pakistan Ltd, a local subsidiary of Zorlu Enerji of Turkey, pursuing the development a 50-megwatt wind power project, will complete and commission the first phase of the project (6 megawatts) in December 2008. Five turbines of 1.2-megawatt capacity each will be installed in this phase. All the equipment, including rotor blades, towers, generators, etc, has already arrived at the project's site. Moreover, in another development, the AEDB has signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Karachi Port Trust (KPT) for the development of a 50-megawatt wind power project at Hawks Bay, Karachi. As per the MOU, the KPT will develop the project and the AEDB will facilitate it in this process.

With the government's commitment in place and the LoIs intact, the hope for harnessing wind energy can offer a much needed relief to the people of Pakistan. However, more challenges await the government and the wind IPPs, because turbine and masts are in short supply in the international market owing to the growing dependence on cleaner energy sources. Germany is by far the leader in wind power technology, followed by the Netherlands, Denmark and other European countries. The international market for turbines is living with a delay of 14-16 months. As usual, Pakistan is left with the quick-fix solution of installing the Chinese-made windmills, which do not match the European standards of efficiency and durability.

Pakistan must not repeat the mistakes it made during conversion from petrol to natural gas, by not seeking transfer of technology from friendly nations and CNG market leaders, such as Italy. CNG kits and cylinders worth millions of dollars are imported every year in the age of weakening rupee against dollar. AEDB officials say talks are underway with international companies to start the manufacturing of micro-wind turbines and parts of large wind turbines. So far, about 30 wind mills for pumping water have been installed for experimental purposes in different parts of Sindh and Balochistan.

In addition to the development activities in the field of wind energy for on-grid electricity production, wind energy is also being used for the electrification of remote off-grid villages in the southern coastal areas of Pakistan. So far, more than 18 villages have been electrified using micro-wind turbines. Moreover, indigenous development of micro-wind turbines has also started in Pakistan. The last but not the least factor worth considering remains the lack of trained workforce for the installation and maintenance of wind turbines. With widening demand-supply gaps in the power sector and the need for trained manpower staring in the face, the government should enter into agreements with European nations as much for technology transfer as for the training of workforce.

The writer is a special correspondent of Geo News, Islamabad

Taliban-style law irks Musharraf regime

Naveed Ahmad

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC

July 27, 2005

 

The hasty passage of controversial Hisba (accountability) bill, termed as Taliban-style moral code by critics, in the Northwest Froentier Province not only intensifies the struggle between Islamists and liberals, but also challenges Pakistani president General Musharraf’s slogan of ‘enlightened moderation’. The Hisba plan is seen as similar to the Department of Vice and Virtue set up by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. The disputed legislation is just a short of governor’s ceremonial approval to become a full-fledge law.  The governor, an appointee of General Musharraf, strongly opposes the ‘Talibanization’ of the province.

BACKGROUND: Under the new law, the North West Frontier Province government would appoint ombudsmen (mohtasibs) – those who hold others accountable – at provincial, district and village levels to ensure that people respect the call to prayers, pray on time, and do not engage in commerce during the Friday prayers besides stopping unrelated men and women from appearing in public places together, and discourage singing and dancing.

With a religious police under his command as an enforcement arm, the army of newly-appointed mohtasibs would also monitor the media to ensure ‘useful for the promotion of Islamic values’. Besides General Musharraf’s regime, human rights organizations, politicians and media bodies see the attempt by the religious clerics to  ‘effectively install ultra-conservative rule’ in the province, conflicting with fundamental rights enshrined in the 1973 constitution and violating personal freedoms.

Although Pakistan’s ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, has hastened to file a rare presidential reference in the Supreme Court seeking its opinion in a ‘damage control’ measure, the atmosphere is highly charged to the benefit of six party religiouspolitical alliance – Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA) - ahead of nationwide local government elections.

The Frontier province, is the only one amongst Pakistan’s four federating units to be ruled solely by the Islamists while the same alliance is a coalition partner with the pro-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League in Balochistan province which also borders Afghanistan.

For the first time in the country’s history, the religious parties grouped together ahead of the 2002 electoral alliance in reaction to the invasion of Afghanistan by United States and its allies. The religious-political alliance managed to gain an unexpected number of seats, predominantly in the NWFP and Balochistan provinces. Besides playing on the anti-US and anti-Musharraf sentiments, the MMA leadership promised replacing all secular laws and practices with the Islamic ones once they were voted to power.

MMA Secretary General Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman, a religious cleric representing the Deobandi shade of Islam, congratulating the people after the passage of the Hisba bill with a 68-43 vote, said, “We have delivered what we had promised to you in the election campaign and with your cooperation, more such Islamic laws would be implemented in the province.”

Although the law and order situation in the MMA-led province has by far been the best over the past three years, there has been little change in the standard of living of the common man in the Afghan refugee-infested province. While the alliance’s leadership mulls creating an Islamic society, their chosen chief minister and some of his cabinet members are being alleged to have involved in corruption and nepotism. “To cover up their failings and weakness, once again the mullahs are hiding behind Islam,” said Asma Jehangir, former chairperson of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan.

Except cricket hero and philanthropist Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf party, every political circle in the country is questioning the timing of the move. “More than their desire to Islamize Pakistani society, the mullahs have timed the passage to regain support ahead of the local body elections,” said Senator Farahatullah Babar of Pakistan Peoples’ Party. Still MMA leader Hafiz Hussain Ahmad defended the passage of the controversial bill and questioned the basis of General Pervez Muaharraf’s reference in the Supreme Court. The superior court can interpret the laws but cannot reverse them or

give a judgment on their practicability, he said.

Meanwhile, the 9-member court bench led by the chief justice is set to start hearing into the presidential reference under the Supreme Court Advisory Jurisdiction (Article 186 of the Constitution) to extend its opinion on constitutionality and validity of the legislation in question.

IMPLICATIONS: Creating a religious watchdog body to monitor the observance of religious values in public places not only runs contrary to the much publicized ‘enlightened moderation’ but is also being propagated as ‘violation of fundamental rights’.

Although the passage of Hisba bill has temporarily united the anti-Musharraf forces, the same circles continue to blame the country’s military elite for creating an enabling environment for the MMA’s advances in the 2002 general election.

While analysts foresee a tough turf battle between the liberals and the Islamists, constitutional experts believe that the enactment of the Hisba bill would encroach on an existing justice system by creating a parallel one on religious lines, undermining judicial independence and denying citizens their right of access to courts. Many analysts blame the Musharraf regime for deliberately failing to engage the MMA government in talks but instead to opt to confront a democratically elected provincial government.

“The insecure general needed something fresh to remind the west how volatile the situation in the frontline state is and how indispensable he remains as war on terror goes on without an end in sight,” says Tariq Mahmood, former judge and president of Supreme Court Bar Association.

Politically speaking, the implications are serious for the camps, pro-Musharraf and the Islamists with local bodies’ elections just around the corner in August and a general election likely in 2006 after a likely deal with the liberal-minded but powerhungry Peoples’ Party led by Benazir Bhutto. On the ground, the gulf within the Pakistani liberal elite and common people, majority of whom is relatively conservative, has further widened after a recent crackdown on religious schools all over the country following General Musharraf’s promise with British Premier Tony Blair to extend all help in a probe into the 7/7 perpetrators.

CONCLUSIONS: Following the government’s flawed handling of the MMA in the NWFP and the crackdown on religious schools, the MMA, with its enormous and pro-active street power, already seems to emerge as beneficiaries while Musharraf and his associates as losers.

Whether the Hisba is enacted into a law after ceremonial approval from the governor or shut down by the supreme court, the MMA stands a fair chance to gain politically in the forthcoming polls for attempting to Islamize the largely conservative northwestern province in particular and the rest of the country in general. Since the fresh row with Musharraf’s administration, the internal cracks of the MMA seem to have filled up and the alliance is ready to contest the forthcoming series of elections.

Last time, it was 9/11 and the subsequent carpet bombing of Afghanistan by the US-led coalition; while this time, Musharraf regime’s mishandling of the Hisba bill and poorly planned actions against religious schools in the backdrop of 7/7 are setting the tone of the election campaign for the theocratic alliance. The MMA’s move to enact the Hisba Bill has more political undertones than theocratic; yet civil society activists are harping to create a paranoia amongst their ‘valued audience’ in the western capitals.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Naveed Ahmad is an investigative journalist, broadcaster and academic whose work regularly appears in the Pakistani daily newspaper, The News, and the monthly magazine, Newsline. He also hosts a 30-minute current affairs talk show, Insight, for Radio Pakistan’s News and Current Affairs Channel. He serves on the panel of the Global Journalists Program, which is associated with the International Press Institute and U.S. National Public Radio.

A Nation's Strength

Ralph Waldo Emerson

What makes a nation's pillars high
And it's foundations strong?
What makes it mighty to defy
The foes that round it throng?

It is not gold. Its kingdoms grand
Go down in battle shock;
Its shafts are laid on sinking sand,
Not on abiding rock.

Is it the sword? Ask the red dust
Of empires passed away;
The blood has turned their stones to rust,
Their glory to decay.

And is it pride? Ah, that bright crown
Has seemed to nations sweet;
But God has struck its luster down
In ashes at his feet.

Not gold but only men can make
A people great and strong;
Men who for truth and honor's sake
Stand fast and suffer long.

Brave men who work while others sleep,
Who dare while others fly...
They build a nation's pillars deep
And lift them to the sky.

Musharraf's options reduced amid political turmoil

By Naveed Ahmad (05/16/2007 issue of the CACI Analyst, John's Hopkins University, Washington DC)

http://www.cacianalyst.org/newsite/?q=node/4613

Until early March 2007, General Pervez Musharraf looked determined to win another presidential term smoothly while attaining a majority in parliament after the 2007 elections. However, his March 9 decision to remove the chief justice of Supreme Court, Iftikhar Chaudhry, changed matters. Since October 9, 1999, none has stood his ground as firmly against the military ruler as did Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Not only does he refuse to step down, but also seeks an open trial. His defiance to the President has won Justice Iftikhar unprecedented street support in Pakistan.

Background: Like ´preceding Pakistani military rulers, General Musharraf has expressed his desire to “continue serving the country as president for another four-year term”. By striking a deal with Islamist parties – the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal - to resign his position as army chief by December 2004, General Musharraf won a rare Parliamentary approval for his presidency. Earlier, Pakistan’s Supreme Court had validated his military coup, applying the ‘doctrine of necessity’. Though several judges preferred to resign over legalizing Musharraf’s military rule, now defiant Justice Ifitkhar Chaudhry had no objections.

Since assuming the chief justice’s office, Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry has, by far, been the harbinger of judicial activism in the country through his frequent suo moto actions on issues concerning the downtrodden people of the country. Justice Chaudhry’s in-court observations and verdicts against government policies alarmed the Musharraf camp while newspapers and political analysts lauded his defiance. Among other, he reversed a shady privatization deal for the country’s massive steel mill, and embarrassed military intelligence agencies by questioning them about the whereabouts of missing citizens.

On March 9, Chief Justice Chaudhry was charged with ‘misconduct’ and ‘misuse of authority’ by General Musharraf, and a reference was sent to the Supreme Judicial Council for a decision. Another senior judge was hurriedly sworn in as the acting chief justice.
The charge against Justice Chaudhry is based primarily on a letter by television personality and Supreme Court advocate Naeem Bokhari, who accused Chaudhry of announcing decisions in court and then giving an opposite decision in the written judgment, insulting and intimidating lawyers, insisting on ostentatious protocol and using expensive cars and airplanes, as well as influencing decision-makers to help his son make his career in the bureaucracy without due merit.

Before serving the reference on the chief justice, Musharraf summoned him at his official army chief residence to demand his resignation. Justice Chaudhry was stopped from leaving for home and kept in custody hours upon his refusal to quit.

As the news hit the electronic and print media, the legal fraternity and the public both reacted angrily towards Musharraf. The Supreme Court has not only stopped the inquiry tribunal from hearing the questionable reference, but also sought reviews into the legality of the charges and a host of issues concerning constitutionality of the proceedings. Now, the chief justice receives elaborate welcome receptions as he visits the country to address the bar associations to mark the 50th anniversary of Supreme Court.

Implications: Much has changed on the nation’s political horizon since the March 9 reference. Musharraf suffers a serious loss of credibility and respect within the ruling coalition. Whether it is a court of law or a TV talk show, the government is at pains getting lawyers as well as commentators to defend its case.

Though the reference against Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry remains sub judice, the government is already facing its fallout. Lawyers have united behind the chief justice, showcasing him as the symbol of rule of law and independence of the judiciary. The media has supported him as well. Last but not the least, it appears that the public is reacting seriously for the first time in the past eight years. Meanwhile, Musharraf and his key allied party – the Pakistan Muslim League (Q) – twice attempted to show street power but with little success.

The Muttahida Qaumi Movement, an ethno-political but militant party comprising Mohajirs (Urdu-speaking migrants from India) resorted to violence in a bid to stop activists of other political parties from expressing solidarity with the chief justice on his visit to Karachi last week. At least 46 people were killed in the violence, while the provincial government and law enforcing authorities watched it happen from the sidelines.

As vocal protests and rallies against the Musharraf regime continue outside the Supreme Court and elsewhere in the country, signs of his weakening are abundantly clear. Musharraf is faced with a gigantic challenge to keep the ruling alliance intact. The biggest challenge for the general is to keep his prime support base – corps commanders and other army generals – fully behind him. Speculations are rife that Musharraf’s handling of the Chief Justice affair has earned him opposition also within the army ranks. The judicial crisis also pulled the political parties out of their isolation, bringing them back in contact with the people ahead of elections due in November 2007.

Shifting political stands bring to surface the most worrisome question for Islamabad as well as its allies: the future of war on terror. It is unlikely that either of the two mainstream political parties, i.e. Benazir Bhutto’s Peoples’ Party and Nawaz Sharif’s Muslim League, would drastically change Islamabad’s policy against extremism and the Taliban if voted to power. However, any regime change and resulting rethinking of policy at this point in time could cost not only Pakistan dearly but also affect the United States and NATO’s role in Afghanistan.

Conclusions: Predominantly, political analysts find little room for Musharraf in the next political dispensation. Even some senior cabinet members have been asking for the withdrawal of the reference against the Chief Justice in a bid to control the damage. The trigger effect has already united the nation’s divided legal fraternity as well as the fractured opposition leadership, some of whom were close to striking a deal with the military regime. Faced with a deficit of options, Musharraf is struggling to muster some public confidence as well as regain his slipping grip over the situation. The more he acts, the deeper he gets into the marshy politico-legal affairs of the state. So far, he has made profusely clear his intention of not withdrawing the controversial reference. With Musharraf’s eight-year rule and centralized decision-making on the one hand, and a fuming legal fraternity and excited political activists on the other, Pakistan could be headed for a violent showdown over the next few months. The time is near when Musharraf may have to bargain his army chief office to strike a deal with the liberal-minded Peoples’ Party, for example; or leave the nation at the mercy of political unrest, shutting the door on democratic forces and leaving the war against terror unfinished.

Author's Bio: Naveed Ahmad is an investigative journalist, whose work regularly appears on the TV channel Geo News and stories are published in The News, and the monthly magazine, Newsline. He frequently reports for American and other western newspapers on South Asian security, energy and politics.

Musharraf finds friends in West, foes at home

The West’s support for Pakistan’s military dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, will not be enough to keep him above water at home, where political and militant opposition against him is growing.

Commentary by Naveed Ahmad in Islamabad for ISN Security Watch (03/02/05)


http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?id=107634&lng=en
 
In the West, Pakistan’s military president, General Pervez Musharraf, has been praised as a staunch ally in the “war on terror”, but at home he is better known as a dictatorial leader who has kept democracy at bay by ensuring that the military controls every aspect of political life. And while there is no sign that his support in the West is waning, there have been indications that his days could be numbered, as the opposition picks up momentum. The Pakistani military dictator’s decision to stay on as army chief, while at the same time controlling the all-powerful office of the presidency, came as no real surprise to most Pakistanis. On 30 December 2004, Musharraf reneged on his promise made the year before to shed his military uniform in order to legitimize the presidency. Musharraf already has the power to appoint all three chiefs of the armed forces and the chief justices of the courts, sack an elected government, and even dissolve the parliament. And while he has made a good show before the Western world of targeting corruption, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and various opposition leaders say that Musharraf is only blackmailing parliamentarians with the threat of corruption charges if they should go against his policies. Musharraf will remain the head of the military until 2007, unless fate ordains otherwise, which it very well could in the face of growing opposition to his rule and increasing Islamist militancy - not to mention the three known assassination attempts he has survived since September 2001 alone.

Consolidating power

After the October 1999 bloodless military coup against prime minister Nawaz Sharif, the political forces' immediate reaction was to seek a fast transition back to civilian rule. The question for politicians all along has been how to get the army back in the barracks, and how to get on with politics as usual - one of the ultimate goals of which would be to put the military in its rightful place as the government department responsible for defending the country's geographical frontiers. Musharraf’s view, on the other hand, is a divergent one, which is entrenched within the military. He has established a military-dominated National Security Council and consolidated his position within the armed forces. He has the power to choose the commanders of both the air force and the navy, with no checks and balances. Musharraf is on his third extension as general since 1998. Since 1999, he has reshuffled and pre-maturely retired 38 lieutenant and major generals, amongst whom nine were commanding the army corps - and six alone in the most critical Rawalpindi Corps, the closest to the nerve and power center of Islamabad.

Growing opposition

But opposition to Musharraf - both in the government and among militant forces - is growing, and there is always the fear of another assassination attempt. Those fears are especially prevalent since the suspected mastermind of the attempts on his life escaped from custody at Rawalpindi’s Chaklala air base and is still on the run. Opposition parties are growing bolder. Ditched and left in the cold, the religio-political alliance Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (the United Action Front, MMA), has already begun mobilizing its street power by launching an “oust Musharraf campaign”. The outspoken opposition leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmad, has repeatedly branded the general as “a security threat” to Pakistan, for siding with the US in killing innocent Muslims. At the same time, the pro-Western liberal and democratic Pakistan Peoples Party has half-heartedly joined the staunch, anti-Musharraf Pakistan Muslim League of deposed prime minister Sharif, and is set to launch a resistance campaign from a common platform called the Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD). While the influential MMA has already embarked on a hard-hitting protest campaign, the ARD has yet to chalk out its own plans. Sooner or later, though, the two groups are bound to join forces.

The threat of Islamist militancy

Musharraf’s greatest worry is the growing political appeal for Islamists and militancy. The unchecked military operations targeting the country’s tribal region of South Waziristan have created much anger and discontent among Muslims in the area. The result has been a groundswell of support for Islamists. While the fractious political opposition may lack the required shrewdness to bring down the most powerful dictator in the country's 57-year history, the militants will prove more of a challenge. Musharraf’s fate depends less on support from foreign capitals and loyal subordinates in fatigues, and more on how smartly he manages to limit opposition to his person and policies from political and militant opponents. And the line between his political and militant opponents is becoming increasingly blurred, with six mainstream Islamist parties united under the MMA umbrella to form a powerful opposition that holds much influence in the restive Frontier and Balochistan provinces neighboring Afghanistan.

Signs of reconciliation?

Despite the backing of the army and the US, Musharraf is floundering. So far, the military's backing has provided the system with a semblance of stability, but it is crumbling under its own contradictions. The parliament and the cabinet are almost dysfunctional. In a space of just three months, Musharraf has sacked one prime minister, pushed aside a second, and appointed a third. It is widely understood that he has initiated a reconciliation process with the pro-Western People’s Party of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto. That move in itself demonstrates Musharraf’s own insecurity. Bringing Bhutto’s pro-Western party back onto the scene would leave less room for Islamist parties, like the influential MMA, to maneuver. In the restive and resource-rich province of Balochistan, where military forces are battling almost daily rocket attacks from tribal militants, there are also signs that Musharraf is rethinking his strategy. On Wednesday, he called for a peace resolution to the conflict in lieu of direct military action.

Friends in high places

While the general thrives on military support at home, abroad he thrives on support from Washington, London, Paris, and other power centers. He has cleverly played his cards as a frontline ally of US President George Bush in the “war on terror”, while at the same time crushing the last vestiges of democracy in Pakistan and luring Pakistani citizens with promises of “good governance” and economic development. Former US secretary of state Colin Powell certainly recognized Musharraf’s usefulness in the “war on terror”, stating publicly that it was necessary for the general to hold on to his dual position as president and army chief in order to continue fighting terrorism. "We've got the Pakistanis playing a much more aggressive role in their frontier areas to go after Taliban and al-Qaida remnants and I am personally aware that General Musharraf has made a tremendous difference in helping us achieve our objectives," Powell told reporters in October 2004. Musharraf has deployed 70’000 troops along the Pakistan-Afghan border and has reportedly handed over 500 al-Qaida-linked suspects to the US. “General Musharraf has done for Pakistani what was needed the most over the past many, many years,” he said. In another talk with reporters, he said: "Three years ago this month, Pakistan was certainly tolerating if not directly supporting in many ways the Taliban. We had a very strained, difficult relationship with Pakistan and in a bold, strategic move, President Musharraf decided - in a phone call I will never forget on about the 13th or 14th of September [2001] - that he would move Pakistan in an entirely new direction. "And he has done that," Powell said. Indeed, few in Pakistan would argue against that: Musharraf has certainly taken Pakistan in an “entirely new direction” - but towards democracy it is not.

Washington’s priorities

But democracy is not what Washington is primarily concerned with here. Musharraf used his latest tour of Washington, London, and Paris to convey to his domestic opponents that the world was siding with him. Powell rejected suggestions that Musharraf had breached any laws in wanting to retain his position as the chief of his country's powerful army, despite the unconstitutionality of holding that post along with the presidency. "The parliament provided for means for him to do this. He has exercised that option and it is now a matter for the Pakistan people and the Pakistan parliament, which has already judged this, to make any other judgments they wish to make," said Powell. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac were no less generous in their support for their Pakistani ally. Staunch support from the Bush administration has further boosted Musharraf's morale. Musharraf was the second leader, after British Prime Minister Tony Blair, to be received at the White House after Bush's November re-election. There is a clear indication that Washington wants Musharraf to stay in uniform as long as Bush’s “war on terror” continues. And a Pakistani leader in military uniform can certainly deliver far more than a democratically elected one. In a December editorial, the Los Angeles Times, noted: “The general's opponents, it seems, now have no option but to concede that their adversary has returned from the US as a powerful military leader who will remain in control despite what it may mean for the future of democracy in Pakistan.” However, the latest Freedom House study lists Pakistan in the “Not Free” category. It is not included among the countries that grant political rights and civil liberties to their citizens, but is instead ranked with the world’s worst rights violators, such as Rwanda, Angola, Cambodia, and others.

The price for approval

But Washington’s continued support is not without conditions. In return for turning a blind eye to the crushing of democracy in Pakistan, Washington will continue to twist Musharraf's arm over a nuclear proliferation scandal involving one of its top scientists, who sold nuclear secrets to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Last February, top Pakistani scientist Dr Qadeer Khan confessed to having leaked nuclear weapons secrets to the three “rogue” nations. Musharraf pardoned Khan for his sins. But the head of the UN’s nuclear watchdog agency, Mohamed ElBaradei, said Khan’s revelations were likely just the “tip of the iceberg” of nuclear black market dealings. Both the UN and Washington are eager to get their hands on Khan to find out more. What it comes down to is this: Pakistan is the key to finding out about Iran’s nuclear capabilities, and a compliant Musharraf is making this much easier. According to an article in The New Yorker in late January by veteran journalist Seymour Hersh, the Bush administration has been conducting secret reconnaissance missions inside Iran since last summer, if not before. Citing sources “with close ties to the Pentagon”, Hersh said an American commando task force had been working closely with Pakistani scientists and technicians who had had previously dealings with Iranian scientists. That task force, he said, was using information from Pakistani experts to infiltrate eastern Iran from Afghanistan in order to locate Iranian nuclear installations for a possible US attack. Pakistan has denied any “government-to-government contact” or cooperation between Pakistan and the US on the nuclear issue. But if Hersh’s reporting is correct, Washington is likely to want to hold on to these valuable Pakistani ties. In the meantime, it is willing to turn a blind eye to Pakistan’s own nuclear development, which Musharraf is seeking to expand.

Naveed Ahmad is an investigative correspondent for newspaper The News and monthly Newsline. He often contributes to reputed foreign publications. He is a visiting faculty on conflict resolution and civil-military relations at Iqra University. He was awarded the Hawaii-based East-West Center’s Jefferson Fellowship in fall 2000 and the Washington Press Center’s “Conflict Resolution and Nuclear Non-proliferation” fellowship in 2004.

Trouble in Pakistan’s energy-rich Balochistan

As Islamabad moves to exploit its geo-strategic capital in the mineral-rich southwestern Balochistan province, tribal leaders and regional nationalists make it clear they are ready to shed blood to gain more control over the region’s natural resources.

By Naveed Ahmad in Islamabad for ISN Security Watch (30/01/06)


http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?id=107976&lng=en



Since 2002, a total of 843 attacks and incidents of violence have been reported in different parts of Pakistan’s Southwestern Balochistan province, including 54 attacks on law-enforcement agencies, 31 attacks on gas pipelines, 417 rocket attacks on various targets, 291 mine blasts, and 50 abductions. In the same period, a total of 166 incidents of violence were reported in the Kohlu district, including 45 bomb blasts and 110 rocket attacks, according to a senior official of Frontier Corps (FC) paramilitary force.
Normally, a region experiencing violence of this magnitude would feature prominently in major international media publications. But for the most part, what is going on in Balochistan - this far-flung, underdeveloped, but resource-rich Pakistani province bordering Afghanistan and Iran - has been largely ignored by the foreign press.
The most eventful year for the defiant nationalist forces in the province has been 2005, which started and ended with major military operations.
The Pakistani military launched its first operation in Balochistan in mid-January last year, after reports that a female doctor had been raped inside a residential compound belonging to a petroleum company led to retaliation by local tribesmen. The Bugti tribesmen launched a rocket attack on the facility and found themselves engaged in a showdown with the Pakistani military. After heated negotiations in April last year, the military-led government and the tribesmen agreed to a ceasefire.
However, on the night of 13 December last year, the ceasefire came to an explosive end when rebels from the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) fired two rockets at the Quetta garrison where Pakistani military ruler General Pervez Musharraf was staying on the first leg of a two-day visit to the province. Though the military successfully managed to stop the media from reporting the incident, the worst was yet to come.
The following day, the tribesmen struck again, this time firing eight rockets at a camp in mineral-rich Kohlu, where General Musharraf was visiting the newly built garrison and inspecting paramilitary troops. Three of the rockets landed close to the venue, but there were no casualties. The BLA quickly claimed responsibility for the attack. Then, on 15 December, a helicopter carrying the top brass of the Frontier Corps for an aerial view of the volatile region was hit by machine gun fire, injuring the top commanding officers. The BLA again claimed responsibility.

The emergence of the BLA

The BLA, which first emerged in the 1970s, originally consisted mainly of Marri tribesmen, but its composition later changed to include Bugti and Mengal tribesmen. Today, the BLA boasts many members from an educated, middle-class background. And Baloch nationalist leaders say the present conflict has succeeded in uniting, for the first time, the educated Baloch and the tribesmen.
It is the first time the two largest Baloch tribes have set aside their differences to join hands in the struggle. In the 1970s, the Bugtis sat on the fence while the Marris led the Soviet-inspired armed insurrection. More than 6,000 Balochis and around 3,000 soldiers were killed in the bloody conflict, which ended with military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq declaring amnesty. Thousands of Marri tribesmen received weapons training in Afghanistan in the 1970s, and today they rank as strategic planners in the BLA fold. The group has an estimated 4,000 to 5,000 men in its ranks.
Though the identity of its leadership remains secret, the BLA is reportedly led by a man known as “Ballach”, a Moscow University graduate and the younger son of tribal elder Khair Baksh Marri.
In addition to having its own flag and national anthem, the BLA also operates a website, which carries reports of its actions. Due to the porous Afghan and Iranian borders, the BLA men face little trouble in getting sanctuary and weapons, ranging from sophisticated pistols to anti-aircraft guns and missiles.
During a visit to Balochistan earlier last year, ISN Security Watch found the BLA members to be well-trained and well-armed, with machine guns, rocket-launchers, Motorola wireless sets, and Thuraya satellite phones receiving information about the movement of government troops.
Nawab Akbar Bugti, a former senior minister in Balochistan and purportedly one of the most defiant of the tribal elders, told ISN Security Watch: “Why do you ask me whether what the BLA is doing is right or wrong? The question to ponder is why so many people in Balochistan support the BLA?”
The BLA is fighting against domination by the larger Punjab province by denying them natural resources, he told ISN Security Watch by telephone from his hometown of Dera Bugti. Home to half of the country’s population and having the highest literacy rate and most fertile land, Punjab is by far the most prosperous province. Since no political party can form a government in Islamabad without securing a win in the populous Punjab, some of the other regional politicians blame the Punjab for their low standard of living.
Balochistan's deprivation is further aggravated when it comes to federal funding, as funding is allocated based on population - a formula that granted Balochistan 85 per cent less funds than Punjab in the last fiscal year.
Furthermore, because the majority of influential federal politicians, bureaucrats, and generals hail from Punjab, most major development projects and industrial estates have been directed there.
Though natural gas was first discovered in 1952 in Sui in Balochistan, the Baloch capital, Quetta, did not have any natural gas until the 1980s, and only then because an army garrison needed it. But by that time, natural gas had already been supplied to even the most remote villages in Punjab. Today, Sui gas from Balochistan provides 38 per cent of the country’s supply, yet only six per cent of the province’s 6.5 million people have access to it.
“People feel that they won’t get their rights through democratic and legal means,” Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch, a leader of the Balochistan National Party, told ISN Security Watch.

The military mindset

General Musharraf has shown zero tolerance of this tribal defiance. Largely backed by the US because of his collaboration in the “war on terror”, the general has ordered his troops to eliminate the miscreants. And while the military operation launched to punish the defiant tribesmen was initially a limited one, it soon broadened to include other tribes sympathetic to the Baloch nationalist leaders.
Facing stiff resistance from the BLA’s guerrilla tactics, the military resorted to using gunship helicopters and fighter jets to bomb the remote mountain areas. According to the tribal Marri Ittehad Group, 80 people have been killed in those remote operations. The government has kept silent over the number of fatalities.
In the meantime, as military operations in Balochistan intensify, militant attacks on government installations, petroleum pipelines, rail tracks, and power grids are on the rise. The Baloch nationalist forces claim that innocent women and children have been killed by the military. The BLA website has published photos of the blood-soaked dead bodies of children and women they said had been killed in the military operations. The military refutes the charges and claims to have only launched “surgical strikes”.
Lieutenant Colonel Muhammad Naeem, the commander of the paramilitary Frontier Corps, told reporters in Quetta that nine out of 15 militant camps had been dismantled in the Kohlu district alone. During a targeted action against tribesmen, nine FC personnel were killed and 14 others injured, while some 50-55 tribal militants were killed in operations in Kohlu and Dera Bugti, Naeem said. The government claims that 12 militant camps are still operating in the gas-rich Dera Bugti district, with two having been dismantled so far.
Though information from the remote mountainous regions is sketchy, and the media has only very limited access owing to the government’s expressed “security concerns”, the anti-Musharraf opposition and human rights activists largely subscribe to the nationalists’ claims. Opposition parties claim that the government is planning to build three expensive military outposts at Kohlu, Gawadar, and Sui. The country’s strategic planners say these military outposts, called cantonments, are needed for greater security in the province in light of the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US and increasing Indian influence in neighboring Afghanistan and Iran.
“With India continuing to increase its presence in the southern Afghan city of Kandahar, we have no choice but to secure Balochistan against external threats by building additional cantonments,” Lieutenant General Senator Javed Ashraf Qazi, Retd, told ISN Security Watch.
In addition, the elusive al-Qaida leadership provides the Pakistani military with an excuse for larger bases in the once-abandoned province.

Renewed geo-political significance

Covering nearly 350,000 square kilometers, Balochistan is by far the largest of four provinces in the country, though it is home to less than 7 per cent of Pakistan’s population. More than 80 per cent of Balochistan, designated as a tribal area, is governed through special laws that locals complain are highly discriminatory. The police are ill-equipped and poorly staffed, and smuggling and banditry are a major means of subsistence.
In addition to the long, treacherous, and porous borders with Afghanistan and Iran, Balochistan also has a 770km Arabian Sea coastline. This least developed Pakistani province also provides the country with some of its most vital ores, such as uranium and gold, as well as an abundance of natural gas and oil. The recent unrest has roots Musharraf decision to award some lucrative oil and gas exploration in the Kohlu region to companies outside the region. Soon after that, the events of 9/11 revived the geo-political significance of the country’s abandoned province.
When the Soviet troops marched through the streets of the Afghan capital, Kabul, in the late 1970s, Islamabad used Balochistan to house large numbers of ethnic Pashtun refugees from Afghanistan and set up religious seminaries for their education. Those same students later made up the main body of the Taliban that overran Kabul in 1996. After 9/11, the US again appropriated various naval, air, and other facilities in the Pasni, Panjgur, Shamsi, and Quetta areas in Balochistan to attack the Taliban regime. At the same time, Islamabad announced a number of mega development projects in Balochistan and also voiced its intention to establish new military garrisons there. In addition, the government initiated an ambitious deep seaport project in the tiny city of Gawadar, which would be linked to Karachi by a coastal highway. The Chinese engineers are now in the final stages of work on the seaport.
Iran has also been dragged into the quagmire, with Pakistani officials claiming that the Iranian town of Mand is a prominent sanctuary for rebel activity. In addition, Iran had raised serious concerns in 2001 with the handing over to US forces three Pakistani bases in Balochistan at the start of the war in Afghanistan.
India is also not oblivious to the situation in the Pakistani backyard. Pakistani officials claim that two Indian consulates close to the border in Iran and Afghanistan are providing weapons and financial support to the BLA in revenge for the Kashmir insurgency. Tehran and New Delhi both deny the allegations. India’s Foreign Ministry spokesman has twice “advised” Islamabad to exercise restraint in the military operation against Baloch tribesmen.
“The government of India has been watching with concern the spiraling violence in Balochistan and the heavy military action, including use of helicopter gunships and jet fighters by the government of Pakistan to quell it,” Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman Navtej Sarna was quoted as saying. “We hope the government of Pakistan will exercise restraint and take recourse to peaceful discussions to address the grievances of the people of Balochistan."
Pakistan shrugged off the warning, saying India would do best not to interfere in Pakistan’s internal affairs.

Exploits of a medieval tribal system

Initial allocations for the government’s development projects amounted to Rs 140 billion (about US$2.33 billion), the largest sum of federal funds pledged to Balochistan since its independence from British rule in 1947. The other projects included a naval base, a water reservoir, and a network of roads and tunnels.
These massive, back-to-back development projects, in what was until only recently an extremely neglected region, sparked suspicion among nationalist circles that the mineral rich areas would either be separated from the province or a heavy influx of outsiders would reduce their influence in the region.
The nationalists want Islamabad to recognize Baloch rights over their coastline, oil, gas, and other resources. Despite its vast resources, the province lags miserably behind in all human development indicators.
However, the nationalist Baloch leaders have always capitalized on the tribal people’s lack of awareness of their rights, patronage from tyrant tribal chiefs, and Islamabad’s negligence to create a sense of Pakistani identity among them. The nationalist leaders have a vested interested in ensuring the federal government has little control over the province, and the tribesman, suffering from deprivation, support them.
Historically, the military-led governments have used the tribal elders for domestic and regional exploits, such as the insurgency against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In return, the government gives the tribesmen a free hand to operate drug and other smuggling rings, police their own people, and dispense justice as they please. The Afghan-Baloch-Iranian border has now become a major human trafficking hub and a notorious drug smuggling route to the western world. An estimated 80,000 people find their way to the Middle East via Balochistan’s Makran coastline and the neighboring Iranian port each year, according to a senior Interior Ministry official.

Fearing ethnic marginalization

Most Baloch people suspect that once the mega projects are completed, they could become victims of demographic marginalization. The Baloch population is already losing in numbers to the Pashtun ethnic group in districts bordering Northwestern Frontier Province and Afghanistan. Baloch politicians generally use the example of Karachi as a city that followed a markedly non-Baloch pattern of development when a seaport was built by the British in the 19th century.
“Fifty years ago, Karachi had half a million people, all of them locals,” said Sardar Ataullah Mengal, one of the three major tribal chiefs in Balochistan, who recently ended his 18-year exile in London and is now living in Karachi. “Today, Karachi has 14 million people, 80 per cent of them outsiders.”
The nationalist leaders believe the government is trying to turn Gawadar into another Karachi. They believe that one day, five million ethnic Balochis may become a minority in their own province.
Though the Baloch nationalists and the supporters of militancy represent a very small portion of the population, their actions make them a significant factor. The Baloch tragedy is a two-fold one. Firstly, the Baloch people have yet to find a leadership that could free them from the clutches of an unfair tribal system and unite them on a single political platform. The so-called nationalist movement acts on behalf of exploitative and vested tribal leaders who have worked in their own way to deliberately keep the people illiterate and the province under-developed. The second problem lies with the successive authoritarian regimes of Pakistan, which do not believe in the diversity and federal system of the country. Such regimes prefer to do business with tribal leaders instead of democratic forces that could bring the Baloch youth into the national mainstream and encourage them to develop a stake in the country’s political system.
Leading human rights activist IA Rahman told ISN Security Watch: “As for Balochistan, the only significant development over the past 40 years is a national consensus on the denial of its rights for a longer period than has been the fate of any federating unit in Pakistan.”
Even moderate tribal elder Sardar Shahbaz Khan Mazari blames General Musharraf for provoking the Baloch nationalists to violence. “You know the way he talks […] He’s so arrogant […] that’s not acceptable,” he said. In a public speech earlier this year, Musharraf said: “If they [the Baloch nationalists] do anything, I will hit them so hard they won’t know what hit them.” To that Mazari responded: “Musharraf […] has not just antagonized the people but even the senior army hierarchy, the retired ones, who consider him an upstart.”
The general’s decision to stay on as army chief while at the same time serving as the country’s president has created an authoritarian regime that has led to the disillusionment of nearly all sectors of society. And the military he leads chooses to impose administrative solutions to the most sensitive political issues, thus resulting in bloody militancy. Many analysts say that while Musharraf is busy earning kudos from the US for his efforts in the global “war on terror”, the conflict in his own backyard is turning bloodier by the day.

Naveed Ahmad is ISN Security Watch’s senior correspondent in Pakistan. He is an investigative correspondent for newspaper The News and monthly Newsline. He often contributes to reputed foreign publications. He was awarded the Hawaii-based East-West Center’s Jefferson Fellowship in fall 2000 and the Washington Press Center’s “Conflict Resolution and Nuclear Non-proliferation” fellowship in 2004. He serves on the panel of the Global Journalists Program, which is associated with the International Press Institute and U.S. National Public Radio.

Pakistani humanitarian disaster to trigger chaos

The Pakistani military’s unchecked “war on terror” in the country’s tribal areas bordering Afghanistan could risk alienating tribes that might very well respond by upsetting the stability of an already volatile region.

By Naveed Ahmad for ISN Security Watch (24/09/2004)

http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?id=108033&lng=en


Predictably, last week’s meeting between US President George Bush and Pakistani ruler General Pervez Musharraf covered various aspects of the “war on terror”, with Washington vowing to enhance economic ties with its frontline ally and offering renewed assurances of its support for Islamabad’s anti-terrorism efforts. The two administrations are pinning high hopes on the progress of a joint working group on terrorism and law enforcement. US Secretary of State Colin Powell praised General Musharraf for “doing quite a lot in the western part of the country and in the tribal areas along the border”. And clearly, there is no doubt that Pakistan’s armed forces are pursuing an expensive military operation in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan - operations that only seem to be intensifying as US presidential elections near. For about one year now, the Pakistani military has been engaged in operations in the country’s backward and remote tribal areas, particularly the South Waziristan Agency (SWA). But other than military reports as to the success of the operations and the number of “terrorists” killed or arrested, no one really knows what is happening there, with access to the region having been completely cut off by the government.

Information blockage

Since the area has been completely sealed off to commercial or humanitarian activities - and barred to journalists or any other non-military personnel - little reliable information is available, and the media is forced to simply take the government’s word that the “war on terror” is having no negative affects on the rest of the population. Neither the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) nor any other local or international humanitarian groups have set foot in the region since the military launched its anti-terrorist sweep. Any non-resident of the tribal areas, which were created in the early 20th century as a buffer zone between the British Empire and Afghanistan, needs written permission from the government to enter the region. There are a handful of tribal journalists who have gained partial access to the SWA, but they have not been permitted to wander around or visit any of the sites where the military claimed to have destroyed an al-Qaida hideout. Local media are full of rumors about events in South Waziristan, but none of the stories have been confirmed. The latest of the widely circulated rumors said that terrorists in the Wana region had surrounded over 100 soldiers, and even that some Indians have been killed in the area. The military’s spokesman, Major-General Shaukat Sultan, categorically denied both rumors. As a gesture of goodwill, Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz announced that the government would lift the ban imposed on commercial activity in the Wana sub division, as talks continue between militants and political authorities. In practical terms, lifting the ban is only for foreign media consumption and could have lasting impact only after the military action is called off, and a political process towards peaceful settlement is given a chance.

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>The tribal maze

Spread over 6’619 square kilometers, the South Waziristan Agency is the largest and poorest of Pakistan’s seven tribal agencies, which were the brainchild of British colonizers. The agency consists of three sub-divisions: Ladha, Sarokai, and Wana, the latter serving as the capital and the center of the military’s operations. According to census documents and tribal elders, the Mehsud tribe largely inhabits the former two sub-divisions, while the Wazir, Dotana, and Sulaimankhel tribes inhabit Wana. The Wazir tribe is further divided into nine sub-tribes, of which the Zalikhel tribe is the largest. The Yargulkhel tribe is a clan of the Zalikhel tribe, and has been a thorn in the government’s side, showing firm resistance to law-enforcement agencies during the security sweeps. They live mostly in Kaloosha, Azam Warsak, and Daja Ghundai, some 10km from the capital. There are only two main roads, the Wana-Azam Warsak Road, which is about 20km long and was constructed after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Wana-Wakhwa road, which was built with US aid in the 1990s. The Wazir tribe possesses inherited lands in Afghanistan’s Paktika, Shakeen, Bermal, Zabal, and Kandahar provinces, as well as property in Pakistan’s Dera Ismail Khan district.

Fleeing the wreckage

Various sources suggest that by June 2004, over 30’000 local tribesmen had crossed into Afghanistan to seek refuge from the Pakistani military, while over the past few weeks, another 20’000 have fled to Pakistan’s financial capital and southern-most port city, Karachi. Karachi houses the largest concentration of ethnic Pashtuns, who control the transportation business and provide a source of hard labor. Bus drivers in the area told ISN Security Watch that at least 500 tribal people have been arriving in Karachi every day for the past 10-12 days. Some Karachi-based Urdu-language newspapers have also published interviews with and photographs of families reaching the city after having lost everything in the tribal areas. Even the tribal elders and the local journalists could not put a figure on the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) moving to nearby peaceful districts, such as Tank and Dera Ismail Khan. As the operation began last year, hundreds of families began to flee the area, but still many more had nowhere to go and have been forced to live in what many say is now the wreckage of South Waziristan. Local journalists claim that soldiers have occupied every second vacated home close to the Wana-Azam Warsak Road, thus denying civilians the right to use the only two single-lane roads. The local tribesmen now have to pay a fare of Rs 350 (about US$6) while taking a detour using an alternate road when it is sporadically opened to the public, compared to the peacetime cost of only Rs 10 (about US$0.17). And it can take up to five hours to reach a destination that is usually only 10 minutes away. Similarly, due to short supply of food items in the region, the price of 80 kilograms of wheat flour has shot up to Rs 2’500 (US$41.5) from Rs 1’050 (US$17.5).

Operation enigmatic

Skyrocketing costs and vacated homes aside, witnesses say they have never seen or heard of any “well-known” or “high-value” terrorists being arrested or killed in South Waziristan, and analysts have widely linked the military operation in Wana to the US elections - suggesting that Pakistan is providing the US administration with evidence that something productive is being done towards winning the “war on terror”. For the first time in the country’s history, fighter aircraft are being used to bombard the region. ISN Security Watch learned that the Pakistani Air Force had initially resisted the army’s demand for assistance, but eventually caved in. “The Air Force has resisted the participation in the military operation as much as it could, but then we agreed with the assurance of the provision of exact locations of target,” a senior officer said on condition of anonymity. He told ISN Security Watch that the Pakistani people were proud of their air force and that “we would not like to be seen like the Israeli Air Force, bombarding innocent people”. Now the Pakistani Air Force’s F-7Ps are assisting the army’s US-made gunship helicopters in providing close air support for the army’s ground operations. Military officials claim to have killed 150 terrorists and arrested 150 more in the tribal region, but many insiders believe that the operation against alleged al-Qaida suspects has achieved nothing but death, destruction, and the displacement of innocent people and their property.

Sandwiched between the army and al-Qaida

The number of individual “terrorist” deaths and arrests reported by state-run television and announced by various military officials is far higher than the overall number publicly acknowledged by the army’s own spokesperson, Major-General Sultan. And questions remainabout the number and identities of those killed and arrested. “There are uncounted deaths of innocent people women, children, and the elderly, who failed to quit the area in time,” said Ansar Abbasi, an investigative journalist who heads the Islamabad Bureau of The News daily. “The human rights organizations don’t talk about such killings for fear of annoying their donors, and thus losing their support,” he remarked. While the government reports some 150 “terrorist” deaths, the independent media have challenged both the death toll and the identities of those actually killed. And there have been other undeniable instances of serious collateral damage, including the destruction of dozens of orchards and tube wells. The karez system of irrigation, introduced under British rule, is yet another casualty of the frequent bombardment and shelling. Conservative estimates of injuries sustained by non-combatants are said to be in the hundreds, while medical services are scarce. Wana District Hospital and Wana Tehsil Hospital, the two main medical facilities available, have only recently been reopened. There is one more hospital owned by a tribesman offering very basic services. In various interviews, Mehsud tribesmen told ISN Security Watch and other newspapers that the inhabitants of Azam Warsak, Kalosha, Dabkot, Daja Ghuandai, Ghawakha, Shah Alam, Kangikhel, Ziarhi Noor, and Wana had passed through a doomsday during an eleven-day military operation in which they witnessed heavy fighting between two powerful forces, the Pakistani Army and al-Qaida operatives. The local residents were either trapped in their mud houses or asked to vacate their houses prior to the operation. In any case, they have suffered tremendously. "We had become sandwiched between the two mighty forces and were just praying for an immediate end to the operation," Umer Khayam Wazir, a university graduate who fled the area, said, adding that army’s heavy shelling had pounded the Shewkai Narai mountains for some 48 hours without letting up. The heavy shelling has claimed dozens of innocent lives. In one incident alone, some 12 people, including six children and five women, died and 13 others were injured when an army gunship fired on a convoy of cars rushing civilians out of Wana.

An unchecked ‘killing spree’

Despite losing 12 family members and two cars, 40-year-old Sher Ali does not blame the army. He is like many other tribesmen who believe that "the soldiers do what they are ordered to do”. His family members, including six children, five women, and his brother were all killed in the military sweep. Federal Interior Minister Aftab Ahmad Khan Sherpao has promised that the government would pay compensation to the families of civilians who have fallen victim to the “war on terror” in Wana. However, nothing has actually been done to that end. The minister told ISN Security Watch: “Any civilian who might suffer injuries in the operation would also be compensated.” He justified the operations, saying that they were being conducted in only those areas of Wana where there were reports of the presence of “foreign elements”. Opposition parties in Pakistan have criticized the government for carrying out “a killing spree at the hands of the armed forces without ever verifying the real identity and role of those tipped off as terrorists by the Americans”. Pakistan’s influential religious-political leadership argues that the foreigners living in South Waziristan have given up their calls for a “jihad”, or religious war, since the early 1990s, and are now living peacefully in the region with their families and other locals. Ershad Mahmud, a well-known academic specializing in the dynamics of India and Pakistan’s Kashmir conflict, told ISN Security Watch: “The use of force against individuals or groups cannot be justified by merely terming them as terrorists. There has to be a clear-cut definition and means to validate the claims made against someone suspected of such crimes.” He believes that the “war on terror” is aimed at reversing any gains made to limit the armed conflict through the application of international humanitarian law and the Geneva Convention.

Fueling the fires of Pashtun resistance

Since the start of the operation about a year ago, schools have remained closed in the troubled, backward South Waziristan region. Moreover, the military demolished some 80 mud-houses that allegedly belonged to suspect militants. The Wana bazaar has been affected the worst due to sanctions imposed by the government. Business in the market, which houses 5’500 shops, has come to a record low, though once around Rs 50 million (about US$833’000) worth of goods - wheat flour, sugar, ghee, and electronics devices smuggled from Afghanistan - made for a bustling bazaar. The untold misery of the local people - widely regarded as “terrorists” by the foreign media, and as miscreants by the Pakistani army - fuels the emotions of the angry, proud, and energetic youth, “who are left with no option but to resist the ‘occupation’ of their land”, Wazir, the SWA university graduate, told ISN Security Watch. The government is trying to overcome that phenomenon by resorting to political options, such as engaging tribesmen in talks and offering amnesties - but so far with little notable success. Thus, the high spirits of jihad, money, terror, and above all the harsh attitude of the political administration, are becoming more embedded among the Pushtun people, who make up over 22 per cent of the country’s population. The implications of Pakistan’s unchecked war against terror could be disastrous, not only for General Musharraf, but also for the country’s territorial integrity.

Operational politics

Malik Muhammad Anwar, a Zalikhel elder, told ISN Security Watch via telephone last week: “The most irritating thing is the lack of respect for the political process, which was never allowed to reach a logical conclusion”. He cited at least six occasions when the army began operations on the same day that a Jirga (traditional tribal council) was to meet. On Saturday, the prime minister invited the region’s religious-political alliance to talks. A veteran senator of the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) party, Professor Khurshid Ahmad, said the talks amounted to little more than “lip service”, saying that the government should take the parliament into confidence and discuss the issues with the legitimate democratic forces in the country. “They would not discuss it there even at the opposition’s insistence, but instead make repeated public statements to meet and discuss outside the parliament.” Khurshid doubted the government’s sincerity to resolve the most pressing issue of the day. Frequent exchanges of views with senior government officials, even ministers and high-ranking military officers, suggest that there is a very small minority that is privy to the military’s real game-plan and exit strategy, if at all one exists, from the “war on terror” in the SWA. Various newspapers have published unconfirmed reports that more than six Pakistani army officers had been detained during an intelligence investigation, but later released. Those officers have remained silent about their detention, but others who had been detained earlier have told media that their families were being harassed to keep to silent. Various politicians, including Islamists, moderates, and even Pakistani nationalists, have repeatedly pointed out that the image of country’s armed forces has been considerably tarnished. “There is no dearth of advice from a variety of quarters saying the same thing: ‘Don’t trust the US too much and act against your own people on its behest. They would repeat what they did after the Soviet disintegration: Leave you out in the cold,’” warned Sardar Auaz Sadiq, an opposition parliamentarian from the Pakistan Muslim League.

A dangerous game of alienation

The government and wanted tribal militants accused of harboring suspected “foreign terrorists” have reached an accord under which the most wanted tribesmen would surrender to the authorities on Wednesday. It is worth emphasizing here that none of the names on the list are actually foreign militants - but only local tribesmen accused of “harboring” them. Interestingly, the accord, being kept secret, is likely to be made public during the governor’s visit to Wana after the Wednesday deadline. Similar accords reached earlier between the two parties have fallen apart, with each side interpreting them to its own advantage. The “wanted” list reportedly includes Ba Khan - the influential Ahmadzai Wazir tribal leader who fled to the Afghan capital of Kabul after the military destroyed 200 shops belonging to his family in Wana. Khan is reportedly seeking political asylum from Afghan transitional president Hamid Karzai. As such, Pakistan’s “war on terror” seems to be increasingly risking the alienation of those people living near the Afghan border - people who, like the Wazirs and the Mahsuds, have traditionally viewed Afghanistan as their true home. For General Musharraf and Hamid Karzai, Ba Khan and many influential tribal elders like him are vital for the security situation along the volatile Afghan-Pakistan border areas. The increasing sense of alienation and betrayal among tribesmen may deal a serious blow to the country’s internal security and its overall territorial integrity.

Naveed Ahmad is ISN Security Watch’s correspondent in Islamabad. He is an investigative reporter for The News and the Karachi-based monthly Newsline. He is a visiting lecturer on conflict resolution at Iqra University. He was awarded the Hawaii-based East-West Center’s Jefferson Fellowship in fall 2000, as well as the Washington Press Center’s “Conflict Resolution and Nuclear Non-proliferation” fellowship.